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ABSTRACT
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was the US government’s fiscal response
to the Great Recession.  An important component of ARRA’s $796  billion proposed budget was $318
billion in fiscal assistance to state and local governments.  We examine the historical experience of
federal government transfers to state and local governments and their impact on aggregate GDP growth,
recognizing that lower-tier governments are their own fiscal agents.  The SVAR analysis explicitly
incorporates federal intergovernmental transfers, disaggregated into project (e.g., infrastructure) aid
and welfare aid, as separate fiscal policies in addition to federal government purchases and federal
net taxes on household and firms.  A narrative analysis provides an alternative identification strategy.
To better understand the estimated aggregate effects of aid on the economy, we also estimate a behavioral
model of state responses to such assistance.   The analysis reaches three conclusions.  First, aggregate
federal transfers to state and local governments are less stimulative than are transfers to households
and firms.  It is important to evaluate the two policies separately.  Second, within intergovernmental
transfers, matching (price) transfers for welfare spending are more effective for stimulating GDP growth
than are unconstrained (income) transfers for project spending.  Matching aid is fully spent on welfare
services or middle-class tax relief; half of project aid is saved and only slowly spent in future years.
Third, simulations using the SVAR specification suggest ARRA assistance would have been 30 percent
more effective in stimulating GDP growth had the share spent on government purchases and project
aid been fully allocated to private sector tax relief and to matching aid to states for lower-income support.
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I. Introduction
The Great Recession and efforts by the federal government  through the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to stimulate the economy have returned fiscal policy, and in
particular the role of state and local governments in such policies, to the center of macroeconomic
policy making.   Passed within the first two months of President Obama’s administration, ARRA
has now spent over $796 billion to stimulate the private economy toward full employment: $381
billion as federal tax relief and expanded unemployment compensation, $98 billion as direct federal
government spending, and $318 billion as intergovernmental transfers to state and local governments
for education spending ($93 billion), infrastructure spending ($70 billion), financing of lower-
income housing ($6 billion), lower-income Medicaid funding ($101 billion), and low-income
assistance ($48 billion).
1  The striking features of this legislation have been its scale, clearly the
largest fiscal stimulus since the Great Depression, and its reliance upon intergovernmental transfers
to state and local governments for implementing central government macroeconomic fiscal policy. 
The Great Recession’s impact on the economies of the member states of the European Union
has been no less damaging, but lacking Union fiscal policies, the burden for recovery has fallen
solely to the European Central Bank and to monetary policy.  ECB policies have proven only
marginally effective, however.  As a result, there is growing interest in developing a complementary
set of Union fiscal policies for macro stabilization, implemented through an EU fiscal union. 
Subsidiarity, the guiding principle for the design of EU policies generally, will place a high premium
on using the political and administrative structures of member countries for the management and
delivery of any Union-wide fiscal stimulus.   As in the United States, then, this will mean
intergovernmental transfers from the Union government to member states.  How should such
transfers be designed to maximize their impact on aggregate, Union-wide economic recovery?  Our
objective here is to provide an answer to this question, both for the possible redesign of US
1 See Recovery.gov/transparency/fundinggoverview/pages/funding.breakdown.aspx. 
1stabilization policies and as a guide for the design of future fiscal policies within the EU.
2 
Central to our analysis is the view that US states and EU member countries act as fiscal
agents of the central government and that intergovernmental transfers from the center to member
states will be the primary policy instrument for control of their fiscal choices.  Large infusions of
central government aid such as ARRA can increase aggregate state or member country  government
spending and, to the extent aid leads to local tax relief, increase private consumption and investment
as well.  The resulting increases in public and private spending may then have positive consequences
for aggregate job and income growth.        
Four recent studies of the local economic impact of ARRA transfers to US state and local
governments suggest this was indeed the case for the first year after the receipt of aid; see Wilson
(2012), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012), and Conley and Dupor (2013). 
These studies relate changes in state or county employment for the one year after the passage of
ARRA to the level of ARRA transfers received by the coincident state or local government, or their
contractors, in the previous fiscal year.  Each finds a significant positive impact on local private and
public employment, with the strongest effects coming from ARRA support for state Medicaid
payments.
3  
These local economy results are valuable but leave three questions unanswered.  First, while
there are measured gains for the local economy receiving assistance, do those gains come at the
expense of, or alternatively might they enhance, the  job or income gains of neighboring economies? 
Recent research, by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), and
Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) studying aggregate interdependencies among EU economies and
by Carlino and Inman (2013b) studying economic interdependencies between US states, finds
significant spillovers across economic neighbors.  Second, because of limitations of the data, the
2  Our lessons may be more general.  In most all fiscal systems, whether explicitly federal or unitary, state,
provincial, and local governments are a primary provider of nondefense government services, and central government
assistance is often an important source of their revenues; see Inman (2007, Table 1).  While the lessons here are based
on an analysis of a federal economy, the US, they are relevant for any public economy using central government transfers
to influence the choices of a local government sector. 
3  Though not our focus here, the central government can also impact local economies through its own spending
and tax subsidies paid directly to households and firms.  For recent analyses of the effectiveness of these policies, see
Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), Cohen, Coval, and Mallory (2011), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010), and Suarez-
Serrato and Wingender (2011). 
2local impact studies can only reveal economic changes for, at most, one year after ARRA spending. 
 Over time, do the positive effects stimulate additional economic activity, do they disappear, or do
they perhaps turn negative?  Third, the local impact studies estimate the effects of ARRA spending
as it is spent.  But  might the state or local government have used ARRA aid to replace its own
planned allocations?  Federal aid is fungible within state and local government budgets, and the
impact studies will miss the economic consequences of subsequent budgetary adjustments.  ARRA
sought to prevent such substitutions by requiring a “maintenance of effort” but such provisions are
unenforceable for all but entirely new programs; see Craig and Inman (1982) generally and Conley
and Dupor (2013) for ARRA.   ARRA funds were “fungible”supplements to existing state and local
programs. 
We address each of these questions and provide the first fully integrated analysis of the
macro-economic effects of intergovernmental transfers.
4  We estimate the general equilibrium
consequences of such assistance over time, allowing for behavioral responses by state and local
governments.  We do so by extending the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  In contrast to their original specification that combines transfers to
state and local governments with transfers to households and firms, we separate out
intergovernmental aid as its own policy.  In doing so, we drop the implicit assumption that state and
local governments are perfect agents for households and firms.  In our specification, state and local
governments may have their own agendas.  If so, intergovernmental transfers may have
consequences for the performance of the macroeconomy distinct from those of direct transfers to,
or taxation of, households and firms.  In addition, we supplement the SVAR analysis with an
alternative identification strategy using a narrative specification for federal aid to state and local
governments, following Ramey (2011a).  Finally, we estimate a model of fiscal choice for state
government budgeting for the 48 mainland states for the period 1979-2010 to clarify exactly how
federal aid determines state allocations, relating the results of this microeconomic analysis to the
estimated impacts of aid on the macroeconomy.  We reach three conclusions.
First, disaggregating federal transfers to governments from federal transfers to households
4  Engemann, Owyang, and Zubairy (2008) have estimated a SVAR model to examine the effects of shocks to
state and local government spending on GDP, but they left unspecified the source of those shocks or the possible role
federal transfers might have played in affecting state and local spending. 
3and firms is important.  From the SVAR analysis, the estimated GDP multipliers for federal net
revenues range from -2 to perhaps as much as -3.6; aggregate transfers to state and local
governments have a much more modest impact, ranging from .5 to .8.  State and local governments
are not perfect agents for households and firms, at least with respect to how the two forms of
transfers ultimately impact the private economy.  We also find it important to further disaggregate
federal transfers to state and local governments into transfers for public employees and public
infrastructure (“project aid”) and then into aid to fund state and local payments for assistance to
lower-income households (“welfare aid”).  Estimated GDP multipliers for welfare aid range from
1.6 to 2.3 and are statistically significant; GDP multipliers for project aid range from 0 to 1.0 and
are often statistically insignificant.  Our results are generally robust to a variety of alternative
specifications, identification strategies, and sample periods.  The narrative approach identifies more
sharply the impact of project aid on GDP and suggests that the project aid multiplier may be closer
1.0 than 0.0; the narrative estimates are statistically significant. 
Second, estimation of the microeconomic model of state budget behavior helps clarify why
welfare aid and project aid have different impacts on the macroeconomy.  Extending the important
early work of Gramlich (1978, 1979) and the more recent work by Taylor (2011) on federal aid and
macro policy, we estimate $.50 of every dollar of project aid is saved and then allocated at the rate
of $.10 a year to future budgets.  Of that $.10, some $.07 is spent on goods or services and $.03 is
allocated to pay down the stock of outstanding government debt.  In contrast, welfare aid is fully
spent, allocated first as increased payments to lower income households and then as tax relief for
middle-class households paid as lower state taxes previously earmarked to support welfare payments
and services.  The final incidence of federal aid may also matter.  Project aid supports payments to
middle-class households; welfare aid is shared between middle-class tax cuts and lower-income
transfers.  Given that lower-income households may be credit-constrained and thus more likely to
spend any given state government transfer or tax cut, larger multipliers for welfare than for project
aid may be expected; see Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006). 
Third, policy simulations based upon the estimated SVAR analysis suggest the impact of
ARRA on GDP growth could have been increased by about 30 percent, or the future tax costs
roughly reduced by one-third, had ARRA funding been fully allocated to tax relief for households
and firms and to welfare aid to state and local governments.  ARRA’s allocations for direct federal
4purchases and for project aid for state and local government purchases are estimated to have had
very modest effects on GDP growth.
Section II presents the framework for our analysis, outlining the SVAR approach and the
narrative approach as alternative identification strategies for estimating the impact of federal aid on
the aggregate economy.  Section III presents our primary results and then tests for the sensitivity of
these results against alternative identification assumptions and sample periods.  Section IV provides
the microeconomic foundation for our macro analysis by specifying and estimating a model of how
state governments might allocate federal assistance to spending, tax relief, and net government
savings.  Section V applies our estimates to provide counterfactual evaluations of the ARRA
stimulus as a source of income growth.    Section VI discusses the potential applicability of our
approach to other federal and non-federal, but decentralized, public economies. 
II.  Estimating the Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Aid
To obtain estimates of the effects of federal aid on the aggregate private economy, we first
extend the structural analysis of variance (SVAR) pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to
explicitly allow for the effects of federal intergovernmental aid and then, as an alternative
identification strategy, develop a narrative record of new and abolished federal aid policies to
provide a separate time series for exogenous changes in federal intergovernmental aid.  Both
approaches begin by separating federal transfers to households and firms from federal transfers to
the state and local government (SL) sector.  All previous research, beginning with Blanchard and
Perotti, has defined federal net revenues as federal revenues less transfers to households and firms
less transfers paid to state and local governments.  Our analysis explicitly recognizes their possible
separate effects on the aggregate economy.
We first define federal net revenues per capita (“taxation,” denoted R) as federal taxes and
fees less federal transfers paid directly to households and firms.
5  We then define federal transfers
to state and local governments (“aid,” denoted A) as all federal transfers to the SL sector including
5  Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we specify federal net revenues (R) as federal government receipts
minus federal government social security benefits to persons minus federal government interest paid.  In addition, we
treat tobacco settlement payments to states as a de facto federal tax on firms, then transferred as part of federal aid to
the state and local sector. 
5federal aid to support income transfers and public services for lower-income households (most
importantly, health care services).   Total federal aid is then separated into its two main components:
general revenue sharing plus project aid (denoted AP) and public welfare plus Medicaid aid (denoted
AW): A = AP + AW.
6  This distinction will prove important in our empirical results.  The third fiscal
policy is direct federal purchases of goods and service (“spending,” denoted G).
7  Not explicitly
modeled, but implicit in our aggregate analysis, are state and local government purchases and state
and local net revenues.     
Figure 1 shows the time pattern of total federal aid per capita (A), federal project aid (AP),
and federal welfare aid (AW)  over the postwar period 1947:1 to 2010:3.  The shaded bands indicate
periods of economic recessions as dated by the NBER.  Real federal aid per capita (2005 dollars)
has risen from $47/person in 1947 to $1,787/person in 2009:1, the last date before the
implementation of President Obama’s ARRA fiscal stimulus.  ARRA spending over the following
year increased aggregate federal aid per capita to $2,081/person.  During this period, total federal
aid as a share of GDP rose from 4/10s of 1 percent in 1947 to 4.3 percent just before the
implementation of ARRA.  For comparison, Figure 2 shows the time path of federal purchases of
6  General revenue sharing/project aid (AP) includes general revenue sharing, elementary and secondary
education aid, model cities and urban renewal aid, transportation aid, all federal aid programs meant to assist SL
government finances after recessions (including ARRA’s “stability aid”), and tobacco settlement payments; see Carlino
and Inman (2013a) for full details.   The tobacco settlement payments are viewed as de facto  “federal aid” financed by
a “tax” on tobacco companies with revenues earmarked to SL spending for smoking prevention and health care expenses. 
This interpretation of the tobacco settlement as federal aid has some political plausibility as well, since the threat of a
direct federal intervention was a strong stimulus for the final, private sector settlement.  Settlement payments are
unconstrained transfers, fungible across the entire state budget; see Singhal (2008).  The two federal aid programs
included in AW are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid.   Federal welfare aid is paid as
a grant that matches the states’ own spending on welfare services, where the administration of payments is lagged with
payments in a given fiscal year based upon expenditures from the prior year and then a final quarter adjustment based
on lagged expenditures in the previous three quarters.  For this reason we assume AW in any quarter is exogenous to
spending in that quarter.  When measuring AP and AW we specifically allow for the change in funding structure under
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).  Beginning in 1997,
PRWORA transformed funding for public welfare from its historical structure as a matching aid program – Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – to an unconstrained, lump-sum transfer known as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF).  When specifying AW and AP we remove AFDC from AW and add TANF to AP;  see
Table 1 and Carlino and Inman (2013a).  Data for AP and AW are from Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S.
Government, Fiscal Year, 2011, Office of Management and Budget (Tables 12.2 and 12.3).  Tobacco settlement
payments are from Funds by State From Settlement Agreement, Center for Social Gerontology, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI.  
All aid variables are given in annual terms and converted to quarterly frequencies.
7  Federal purchases of goods and services are specified as federal government purchases of goods and services
plus federal defense spending plus federal gross investment.
6goods and services (G) and of federal net revenues (R).  Federal purchases rose from $2,190/person
in 1947 (8 percent of GDP) to $5,195/person in 2009:1 (13 percent of GDP) with an additional
$506/person increase since the implementation of ARRA.  Federal net revenues (= revenues -
payments to households) have risen from $1638/person in 1947 (13 percent of GDP) to
$1,775/person in 2009:1 (4.3 percent of GDP) with a reduction of $374/person following ARRA.
8
   A.  SVAR Specification and Identification:  We begin by estimating a four variable SVAR
for the impact of federal net revenues (R), federal government purchases (G), and aggregate federal
aid (A) on national GDP (Y).  The SVAR analysis begins with the estimation of a reduced form
VAR specified as: 
Zt = C(L,q)CZt-1 + ut, where      (1)
                                                                  ZtN = [rt, gt, at, yt], 
and where rr is the log of federal net household revenues (R), gt is the log of federal government
purchases (G), at is the log of aggregate federal aid (A), and yt is the log of GDP (Y), each measured
at quarterly intervals and measured as real (2005) dollars per capita.  Also included in the initial
VAR are the trend variables time and time squared, and an indicator variable for “deep recessions”
(= 1, if the national rate of unemployment exceeds 8 percent). The lag structure C(L,q) is a 4 x 4
matrix of three-quarter distributed lag polynomials, and ut is a 4 x 1 vector of reduced form
innovations, specified as utN = [u
r
t, u
g
t, u
a
t, u
y
t].  The three quarter lag allows for seasonal patterns in
the responses of fiscal variables to GDP.  The AIC test statistic indicates that three lags of the
endogenous variables are optimal; three lags are also sufficient to remove serial correlation from the
residuals.   
To recover the exogenous structural shocks to net federal government revenues, federal
government purchases, and federal aid, denoted as v
r
t, v
g
t, and v
a
t, respectively, we follow the
methodology of Blanchard and Perotti.  First, we take advantage of quarterly variation in our data
and impose the restriction that discretionary changes in fiscal policy take at least one quarter to
respond to changes in GDP.  Thus the contemporaneous discretionary response of net revenues,
purchases, or aid to GDP is zero.  
8  The declining share of net revenues in GDP is due to the disproportionate growth in government transfers
to households over the past 60 years.  Gross federal government revenues equal 16 percent of GDP today and gross
transfers equal 11.7 percent of GDP.  The difference is 4.3 percent. 
7Second, we impose constraints on the ordering of discretionary policy changes, requiring
discretionary revenues to be set prior to discretionary spending for either purchases or aid, and then
within spending, that purchases (largely defense spending) are set prior to federal aid to the SL
sector.  The priority of discretionary revenue changes is a result of the institutional rules established
by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and subsequent legislation
aimed at establishing a revenue-driven budget constraint for federal fiscal policies; see Keith and
Schick (2004) and Auerbach (2003).  Formally, federal net revenues are seen to Granger-cause
federal purchases.
9 We assume discretionary government purchases predetermine spending for
federal aid as, politically, defense spending “trumps” discretionary domestic spending.  However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that domestic spending may hold priority over defense spending
by a Granger-causality test.
10 
Third, we identify the built-in responses of federal tax and transfer policies and federal
purchases to contemporaneous changes in GDP following the specifications proposed originally by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  The built-in contemporaneous elasticity of federal net household
revenues to changes in GDP is set equal to 2.08, while the built-in contemporaneous elasticity of
government purchases with respect to GDP is set at 0.0, reflecting the largely contractual nature of
these outlays.  These estimates come from outside the model and represent the automatic stabilizers
for federal net household revenues and government purchases, respectively.  We test the sensitivity
of our results to alternative estimates of the contemporaneous revenue elasticity, ranging from 1.6
based on direct estimates for the US economy by Follette and Lutz (2010) to 3.0 based upon
estimates by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) using the SVAR
specification.  An estimate of the contemporaneous built-in effects of GDP on federal aid to the SL
sector is obtained from a panel regression for the period 1970-2010 relating the log of total federal-
to-state aid to the log of gross state product (GSP) conditional on year and state fixed effects; our
9  For the full sample period (1947:1 to 2010:3) we reject the null hypothesis that revenues do not Granger-cause
spending (χ
2 = 14.01), but we cannot reject the null that spending does not Granger-cause revenues (χ
2 = 3.84).  
10  For the full sample period (1947:1 to 2010:3) we cannot reject either the null hypothesis that federal aid
Granger-causes federal purchases (χ
2 = 14.26) or the null hypothesis that federal purchases Granger-cause federal aid. 
We have tested for the sensitivity of our core results to the alternative ordering that places domestic spending politically
“prior” to defense spending, and the results remain essentially the same. 
8preferred estimate is -.35.
11           
Formally, the vector of reduced form residuals is specified as a linear combination of
structural shocks:  
    u
r
t = αr,yCu
y
t +  βr,gCv
g
t +  βr,aCv
a
t +  v
r
t,  
    u
g
t = αg,yCu
y
t +  βg,rCv
r
t +  βg,aCv
a
t +  v
g
t, 
    u
a
t = αa,yCu
y
t +  βa,gCv
g
t +  βa,rCv
r
t +  v
a
t, (2)
    u
y
t = αy,rCu
r
t + αy,gCu
g
t + αy,aCu
a
t  +  v
y
t. 
Netting out all contemporaneous responses among the reduced form residuals implies: 
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y
t,  
where each coefficient αp,y specifies the built-in (programmatic) elasticity of fiscal policy (p = r, g,
a) to GDP and each coefficient αy,p the response of GDP to contemporaneous (including exogenous)
changes in each fiscal policy ( p = r, g, a).   
Our initial estimates set αr,y = 2.08, αg,,y = 0, and αa,y = -.35.  From the identification strategy
for the timing of fiscal policy decision-making we set βr,g = βr,a = 0 from the priority of federal
revenues over spending and βg,a = 0 from the priority of government purchases over SL aid.  With
these restrictions, the resulting specification is identified and allows us to estimate the remaining six
free parameters (βg,r, βa,g, βa,r, αy,r,  αy,g, αy,a) and to compute a distribution for the exogenous structural
errors, vtN = [v
r
t, v
g
t, v
a
t, v
y
t].  Returning to the estimated reduced form VAR specification, we can then
estimate impulse response functions for GDP following exogenous shocks in fiscal policy.  
A similar specification and identification strategy applies when the analysis is extended to a
five variable SVAR.  Now the vector of policies and GDP is specified as ZN = [rt, gt, awt, apt, yt],
where awt is the log of federal matching aid for state-funded transfers to lower-income households
(AW) and apt is the log of federal project aid for general state and local government spending or tax
11  The estimated coefficient of total aid with respect to current state GSP is significant at the .95 level of
confidence.  The key identifying assumption is that any effects of federal aid on state incomes – say through the
construction of public infrastructure – take at least a year to impact state incomes.  The negative coefficient reflects the
built-in redistributive component of most federal aid programs; see Melitz and Zumer (2002).  
9relief (AP).  The corresponding vector of exogenous  residuals to be estimated is now  vtN = [v
r
t, v
g
t,
v
aw
t, v
ap
t, v
y
t].  The five variable SVAR is specified as:      
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where we again specify αr,y = 2.08 and αg,,y = 0;  βr,g = βr,aw = βr,ap = 0 by the budgetary priority of
revenue over spending; and βg,aw = βg,ap = 0 from the budgetary priority of government purchases
(largely defense) over grants to the SL sector.  Initially we specify formula welfare aid as prior in
budgeting to discretionary federal program aid and set βaw,ap = 0.  For the five variable SVAR, we use
estimates of the contemporaneous built-in effects of GDP on the two components of federal aid, again
obtained from state panel regressions now relating the log of welfare and program aid to the log of
gross state product (GSP), conditional on year and state fixed effects.  Here the preferred estimates
are αap,y = -.40 and αaw,y = -.19.
12  With these restrictions, the resulting specification in (3) is identified
and allows us to estimate the remaining 10 free parameters (βg,r, βaw,r, βaw,g, βap,r, βap,g, βap,aw, αy,r,  αy,g,
αy,aw, αy,ap) and the resulting vector of exogenous residuals vtN = [v
r
t, v
g
t, v
aw
t, v
ap
t, v
y
t].  This
specification allows us to estimate separate GDP impulse response functions for welfare aid (AW)
and program aid (AP). 
B. Narrative Specification and Identification:  The SVAR approach to identification of
exogenous policy shocks is model dependent with correct identification conditional upon the a priori
specification for the timing of policy choices and the contemporaneous influence of GDP on policies. 
While testing for the robustness of policy responses to alternative SVAR specifications is important
(and we do so below), the use of policy narratives first proposed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) for
federal spending and recently applied to tax policy by Romer and Romer (2010) provides an
alternative identification strategy.  The important issue is, when does the private sector, and for us
12  Each estimated elasticity is significant at the .95 level of confidence.  Again, the negative coefficient
measures the redistributive nature of most federal aid to SL governments.  The lower elasticity for welfare aid likely
reflects the low elasticity of permanent poverty to annual, within-state changes in GSP and then the slow rate of take-up
of residents to income support and Medicaid programs. 
10the SL sector as well, anticipate the implementation of the new federal policy and begin to adjust its
economic choices?  A failure to appropriately identify the announced date of the policy innovation
will lead to biased estimates as to the policy’s impacts on the private economy; see Leeper, Walker,
and Yang (2010) and Ramey (2011a).  For example, policies may look ineffective if agents anticipate
an innovation occurring before the econometrician’s assumed date for the innovation.  The narrative
approach to identification is independent of the econometrician’s model and relies upon political
histories of the fiscal policies to identify both the likely exogeneity of policies from changes in GDP
and the dates when the policies are implemented.
13           
We have developed the narrative history for federal aid to state and local governments from
1947 to the 2009 adoption of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA); see Carlino
and Inman (2013a).  Table 1 provides a summary of the narrative dates for all important new federal
aid programs since 1947.
14  Our narrative approach identifies 21 separate narrative events, 18 where
federal aid is increased and three where aid is reduced.  Two decisions are required to specify the
value of the narrative aid event:  first, the level of new aid and, second, the timing of the innovation. 
We specify the level of aid available from the new program as the amount appropriated for
13  It is also important that the narrative estimates of aid innovations be independent of – that is not responsive
to – contemporaneous increases or decreases in GDP.  This will be true for policy innovations in US federal aid with
the possible exceptions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976, the Economic Stimulus Appropriation Act of
1977, the Intergovernmental Recession Act of 1977, and the reauthorization of CETA  (each a policy response to the
recession of 1973-75), the Emergency Jobs Act of 1983 (a response to the 1981-82 recession), the Job Growth and Tax
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (a response to the 2001 recession), and ARRA in 2009 (a response to the Great Recession
of 2007-09).  For all these policies, aid was approved after the recessions had ended.  However, it is possible that state
and local government officials would have anticipated these policy responses by Congress and begun a budget
adjustment before aid was to be received.  We therefore allow for anticipated federal aid under each policy as follows. 
First, the four policies approved in response to the 1973-75 recession are treated as true innovations as Congress had not
offered post-recession fiscal assistance at any time prior to these four policies.  After 1978, however, post-recession aid
may have been expected.  Second, we therefore assume that states would have anticipated assistance sufficient to cover
their deficits accumulated during the recessions; see National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), The Fiscal
Survey of the States, recession years.  Only new program aid funding above or below the accumulated recession deficits
is treated as a policy innovation.  Third, there were no new programs following the recession of 1990-91, but there were
state deficits.  We treat the failure to pass a policy following this recession as a negative policy innovation.  See Carlino
and Inman (2013a: Addendum: Is Federal Aid Expected in Downturns?).
14  The narrative analysis does not include changes in the federal tax code that impact state and local government
revenues, most notably through changes in the federal definition of taxable income used by many states in setting their
own tax base.  The reason for excluding these policy changes is that the resulting changes in state revenues arise from
transfers between residents within a state.  Our focus here is on changes in revenues paid to states from those outside
the state and viewed by residents – Ricardian arguments aside – as exogenous increases in state and local governments’
budget constraints.   For an analysis of the impact of within state revenue “shocks,” see Ladd (1993).  
11the first full fiscal year of the program’s implementation; beyond the initial year, aid is assumed to
be anticipated.  Because the municipal bond market will only lend against pledged federal assistance
within the fiscal year (via Revenue Anticipation Notes, or RANs),
15 we do not discount future aid
except for two innovations.  The first is the legislated phased reduction in federal funding of general
revenue sharing from 1981 to 1983 for state governments and from 1984 to 1987 for local
governments.  The second is the tobacco settlement revenue specified in the Master Settlement
Agreement with US tobacco companies  beginning in 1998:4 and to be paid through 2025.  Though
paid directly by tobacco firms to states, we treat these revenues as de facto exogenous assistance by
the federal government.
16  Further, these revenue promises are binding contracts between the state
and the firms, and for this reason the bond markets have been willing to lend to the states against
these promises.  Thus the discounted present value of these promises is used as our measure for level
of this assistance; see Table 1.  
In specifying the timing of an aid innovation, there are three dates on which state and local
officials might begin budgeting in anticipation of new federal assistance: (i) the date of introduction
of the legislation; (ii) the date of passage by Congress if the legislation had been introduced by the
President or the date of signing by the President if there had been a risk of a presidential veto; or (iii)
the date of first federal funding.  Carlino and Inman (2013a) provide all three dates.  Following
Mertens and Ravn (2012), we use only the first date that money was actually sent to the SL sector,
with one institutional adjustment.  We allow for the fact that significant changes in state or local
budgets, whether a spending increase or a tax reduction, are typically not allowed by state law once
the budget has been adopted at the beginning of a fiscal year.
17  This means that an aid innovation that
occurs in the middle of a state’s fiscal year, for example in calendar Q1, cannot be fully incorporated
15  State and local governments’ own savings are insufficient for these governments to do their own “borrowing”
in anticipation of future aid.  Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and Tilly (1994) provide evidence that the aggregate state and local
government sector is credit constrained on their current accounts. 
16  See Singhal (2008).  Apart from the budgetary equivalence of settlement funding and lump-sum federal aid,
there is a good  political reason to treat tobacco settlement funds as de facto federal aid.  It was only after Congress
threatened to impose its own tax and transfer policy to compensate for state Medicaid costs of tobacco-related illnesses
that the tobacco companies agreed to a final settlement. 
17  The one exception is in states with balanced budget rules with a “no carryover” provision.  When they are
running deficits these states are required to raise revenues or curtail spending to ensure an end-of-fiscal-year balanced
budget.  Positive narrative events will not be affected by such rules. 
12into state fiscal decisions until the beginning of the next fiscal year, typically beginning in Q3 and
continuing until Q2 of the subsequent calendar year.  In these cases we attribute the innovation both
to the year when aid money is appropriated (since modest spending might be allowed) and to the next
fiscal year when the new funding can be fully incorporated into the state and local budgets.  All
shocks are annualized.  An F-test that real (2005 dollars) per capita narrative aid as defined in Table
1 is a strong instrument for predicting aggregate federal aid per capita has a test statistic of 10.64.
18 
Estimation of federal aid’s impact on the private economy using a narrative identification
follows the VAR approach of Ramey (2011a), ordering the aggregate narrative aid variable first,
followed by federal net revenues excluding federal aid, federal purchases, and finally GDP.
19  All
variables are now specified in levels to allow for negative innovations.  A quadratic time trend and
three lags are also included in the specification.  Separate narrative estimates are reported for
aggregate aid (denoted ΔA) and project aid (ΔAP).  There are only three narrative events that apply
to welfare aid, and for this reason we have not separately estimated the impact of welfare aid using
narrative identification. 
C.  Comparing Identification Strategies: In Figure 3 we compare the quarterly time paths
for the dollar-equivalent innovations in project aid (Figure 3a) and welfare aid (Figure 3b) as
estimated from the SVAR (dotted lines) and the narrative (solid line) approaches.
20  As summarized
in Table 1, the narrative approach captures innovations to aid from the introduction of new policies. 
The SVAR approach captures not only innovations from new policies but also innovations in how
governments administer existing policies.  Even though Congress has authorized federal aid
spending, the exact timing of expenditures, particularly during any fiscal year, is the responsibility
of the President through the decision to appropriate spending.  In the case of welfare aid, which is
18  Also included in the federal aid regressions with narrative aid are three lag values of net revenues,
government purchases, and federal aid.   The F test is for contribution of narrative aid as an explanatory variable for
contemporaneous federal aid.  A value for the F test statistic above 10 is the generally accepted hurdle for a strong
instrument.  The sample period for the reported F test is 1960:1 to 2010:3, the primary period for our analysis.   
19  See also Favero and Giavazzi (2012). 
20  The estimates of v
ap
t and v
aw
t used to compute the dollar equivalent change for an unexpected shock to project
aid and welfare aid are uncovered from the estimated VAR for the specification reported in Table 3, columns  (1)-(4). 
As specified in the SVAR, v
ap
t and v
aw
t are measured as innovations to the log of project aid and welfare aid respectively. 
These percentage innovations were multiplied by the levels of project and welfare aid to obtain dollar equivalent
innovations for comparison to the narrative aid innovations, also measured in dollars. 
13allocated to match SL spending, appropriations will depend on administrative decisions by governors
as well.
The two identification strategies provide alternative estimates for how exogenous aid might
causally affect GDP.  As first argued by Sims (1998) for monetary policy and recently by Favero and
Giavazzi (2012) for fiscal policy, both approaches provide valid estimates as long as the innovations
are orthogonal to all other shocks in the VAR that might influence GDP growth.  The simple
correlation between SVAR and narrative innovations for project aid is .19 and that between SVAR
and narrative innovations for welfare aid is .13.  Both correlations are statistically significant at the
.95 level of confidence. Having multiple instruments to identify exogenous changes in government
policies is analogous to having multiple instruments for identifying shifts in a supply curve – e.g.,
weather and insects – when estimating a demand curve.  In our case, the narrative approach achieves
identification from the unexpected introduction of new aid policies, while the SVAR approach
achieves identification from both the unanticipated introduction of new policies and from
unanticipated changes in aid because of the administration of existing policies.  
Figure 3 illustrates that both approaches capture the new policy innovations as detailed in
Table 1, while the SVAR innovations also record innovations to federal aid not recorded in the
narrative record.  The exact reasons for these additional, “administrative” SVAR innovations cannot
be identified precisely, but it is perhaps worth noting that the large positive SVAR innovations not
accounted for by matching narrative innovations  occur only for welfare aid and in years just after
recessions, while the large negative SVAR innovations are limited to project aid and occur only
within Republican administrations.  The one exception to this pattern occurs during the Clinton
presidency, when there is the negative SVAR shock to welfare aid in 1996:2 and the positive SVAR
shock to project aid soon thereafter in 1997:3.  This timing is consistent with the reform of welfare
payments to states as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA).  The act ended matching aid to states under Aid for Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and then compensated states with lump-sum assistance under a new program called
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  AFDC aid was cut (the negative innovation in
welfare aid) and TANF aid began (the positive innovation to project aid).  In our specification of
narrative aid, we have combined these two reforms into a single “new policy” event, where the loss
in AFDC aid was slightly larger than the gain in new TANF aid; see Table 1 and Figure 3b over the
14period 1997:3 to 1998:2.  
III.  Results     
A. SVAR Results: Tables 2 and 3 present the SVAR estimates of the impact of federal fiscal
policy on per capita GDP, first for the four variable SVAR specification (Table 2) and then for the
disaggregated federal aid, five variable specification (Table 3).  The tables report the estimated fiscal
multipliers (impulse responses) by quarters for GDP for a one-time, one dollar change in each of the
federal fiscal policies; one standard deviation (68 percent) confidence intervals are reported within
parentheses, and an asterisk indicates when the estimated effect is significantly different from zero
at a 95 percent level of confidence.  To avoid the large breaks in fiscal policy after WWII and from
the Korean War, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and focus our analysis on the period 1960:1
to 2010:3.
  For purposes of comparison, columns (1)- (4) in Table 2 reproduce the three variable SVAR
of Blanchard-Perotti, first for the full sample period 1947:1 to 2010:3 and then for the post 1960
sample.  This initial three variable SVAR adopts the Blanchard-Perotti specification for federal net
revenues defined as federal taxes less transfers to households and firms (our R) less federal aid to the
SL sector (our A): R - A.  The estimates of the impact of federal purchases (G) on GDP in Table 2,
columns (2) and (4) are comparable in magnitude (– 1) and timing (no effects beyond Q8) to the
estimates reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002, Table IV).  Our estimates in Table 2, columns (1)
and (3) for the impact of net revenues as specified by Blanchard-Perotti (R - A) on GDP are
somewhat larger than the estimates of Blanchard and Perotti (2002, Table III) but with comparable
time patterns; our peak tax multiplier is -2.1 compared to their peak of -1.3.  Both studies show
significant tax multipliers into Q8 after the innovation. 
What is central to our analysis is the possible difference between the estimated multipliers for
shocks to net revenues for household and firms only (R) and the separate multipliers for shocks to
federal SL aid (A); see Table 2, columns (5)-(7).   First, estimated  multipliers for government
purchases (G) are now smaller, peaking at .56, and are statistically significant only in this initial
period after the spending innovation, a pattern that holds for the remainder of our analysis and
parallels the results in Barro and Redlick (2011) and summarized in Ramey (2011b).   Most
importantly here, the estimates for this four variable SVAR show federal aid paid to the SL sector
15(A) is far less stimulative of GDP than are taxes paid and transfers received directly by the household
sector (R).  The peak multiplier for A is .8 and its impact on GDP is exhausted after two years.  The
peak multiplier for R is now -3.75 and its impact on GDP lasts into Q12.  These results for a
household-and-firm-only definition of net revenues are comparable to those reported in Romer and
Romer’s (2010) narrative study and Mertens and Ravn’s (2013) SVAR study for the impacts of tax
policy.  Both of those studies focus only on taxes and transfers to the private sector, as does our
definition of R.  The results here suggest it is important to recognize the separate effects on GDP of
innovations in transfers to governments and transfers to households.  To ignore this distinction will
be to overestimate the impacts on GDP of aid to SL governments and to underestimate the impact of
taxes and transfers to households and firms.
Table 3, columns (1)-(4) extend our analysis by disaggregating total SL aid into its two
primary components, welfare aid (AW) and project aid (AP), and then estimating a five variable
SVAR.  The estimated effects for federal net revenues and federal spending innovations are
comparable to those reported in Table 2.   We now observe how innovations in the two forms of
federal aid, AP and AW,  impact GDP.   The effects are significantly different.  The multipliers
associated with an innovation in project aid (AP) are initially small, negative, and statistically
significant, then positive thereafter though never statistically significant; see Table 3, column (3). 
The negative effect of AP following the innovation mirrors results in Gramlich (1978), who found
state and local governments temporarily postponed planned government spending, particularly capital
projects, so as to utilize forthcoming federal project aid.  In contrast, the multipliers associated with
an innovation in welfare aid (AW) are as large as 2.3 (in Q2) and statistically significant into the third
year after the innovation; see Table 3, column (4).  If the policy strategy is to use state and local
governments, and thus SL aid, to stimulate the private economy during a recession, then welfare aid
is significantly more effective than project aid.  The analysis of state budgeting in Section IV clarifies
reasons for these important differences. 
B. Narrative Results: Table 3 also presents estimates for the impact on GDP of total federal
aid per capita (ΔA) and then federal project aid per capita (ΔAP) identified using the narrative record
of policy innovations.  Estimates are from a four variable SVAR ordering narrative aid innovations
first, followed by federal net revenues exclusive of federal aid, federal government purchases, and
GDP.  The estimated multipliers for the narrative innovations in total federal aid (ΔA) are slightly
16larger than the multipliers for total federal aid (A) identified from the initial four variable SVAR;
compare Table 2, column (7) to Table 3, column (5).  The 16 narrative events for project aid alone
(ΔAP) provide a more precise estimate of the effect of AP on GDP; compare Table 3, columns (3)
and (6).  The narrative estimates for project aid are larger than those for project aid using the SVAR
identification strategy, and here the estimates are statistically significant.  Both narrative estimates
have peak multiplier effects of 1.0 and show the initial increase in federal aid continues to stimulate
GDP growth for two years after the policy innovation.   
 C.  Robustness:  Table 4 examines the sensitivity of these core results to alternative model 
specifications and sample periods.  Only the results for federal aid are reported here.
21  The central
results from Table 3 remain intact.  Table 4, columns (1) and (2) gives estimates from the SVAR
replacing the Blanchard-Perotti specification for the contemporaneous impact of GDP on federal net
revenues of αr,y = 2.08 with the alternative estimate of αr,y = 3.00 provided by Mertens and Ravn
(2013).  Mertens and Ravn show that with this alternative specification the SVAR estimates for the
tax multipliers align very closely with the estimates obtained from the narrative approach used by
Romer and Romer.  With this adjustment our estimates for the AP and AW multipliers are smaller
than those reported in Table 3.  The negative impact multiplier for AP assistance remains, as do the
relatively larger effects of AW over AP.
22    
Table 4, columns (3) and (4)  extend the original five equation SVAR for fiscal policy to now
allow for possible confounding effects of monetary policy; see Rossi and Zubairy (2011).  We do so
by adding the federal funds rate and the inflation rate as measures of monetary policy, ordered after
the four fiscal variables (R, G, AW, and AP) and GDP.  With the exception of the federal funds rate 
and the inflation rate, all variables are measured in logs.  Compared to the results in Table 3, the
estimated effects of AP and AW on GDP are again smaller, particularly so for AP.  AW’s multipliers
fall to a range of 1.5 to 2.0 and remain significant to Q6; AP’s multipliers are now no larger than .3
21  The multipliers for federal net revenues and federal government purchases are very similar to those reported
in Tables 2 and 3.
22  We have also reestimated the core SVAR model setting αr,y = 1.6 estimated by Follette and Lutz  (2010). 
With this specification, the peak multipliers for AW is now 2.89, occurring in Q2, and that for AP is .967, also occurring
in Q2.  Here too we see a statistically significant, negative impact multiplier (= . -.139) for AP aid.    AW aid has a
statistically significant effect on GDP into Q12 (= 1.2) while AP aid has a significant effect until Q8 (= .89).  
17and statistically insignificant.  Column (5) adds the federal funds rate and the inflation rate to the
narrative specification, again ordering monetary policy after fiscal policy.  The narrative aid variable
remains significant through Q4.  Again, the impact of fiscal policy is reduced with the inclusion of
monetary policy.  These results mirror those in Rossi and Zubairy (2011; Figures 9 and 11).  
Monetary policy is less than fully accommodating to fiscal policy.
Table 4, columns (6) and (7) report results from reestimating the SVAR after altering the
assumed order by which Congress sets spending policies.  The original specification assumed federal
government purchases predetermine aid policies (βg,,ap = βg,,aw = 0; βaw,g … 0; βap,g … 0).  Now we
reverse that ordering and allow federal aid policies to predetermine federal purchases (βaw,g = 0; βap,g
= 0; βg,,ap … 0, βg,,aw … 0).  Within federal aid, AP now predetermines AW.   With this revised ordering,
AP assistance is estimated to have no positive effects on GDP.  The estimated impacts of AW aid on
GDP remain, however.
Finally, Table 4, columns (8) and (9) report estimates for the original five variable SVAR, but
now for the restricted sample from 1960:Q1 to 1998:Q3, the last quarter before states were aware of
the very large settlement agreement with US tobacco companies.  These tobacco payments are the
largest single infusion of new outside revenues into the SL sector, more than four times larger than
ARRA in present value terms.  To be sure that this one very large event was not unduly influencing
our estimates of aid’s impact, the model was reestimated for the pre-event sample.  The negative
impact effect of AP aid in Q1 remains.  AP multipliers after Q1 are larger (but still statistically
insignificant), as might be expected when a large, positive outlier event is dropped from the
estimation.  AW multipliers are unaffected.
D.  Summary: The prudent conclusion from this analysis is to assign a significant GDP
multiplier of 1.5 to perhaps 2.0 for innovations in welfare aid (AW) and to assign a smaller GDP
multiplier to project aid (AP).  The AP multipliers are never statistically significant using the SVAR
identification and range from .4 to 1.0 using the narrative identification strategy.  Between the two
forms of federal assistance, AW aid appears to be the more effective policy instrument for stimulating
the macroeconomy in times of recession.  In the next section we estimate a behavioral model of state
government budgeting to help us understand the different impacts of these two forms of federal aid
on GDP. 
  
18IV.  States as Agents
In federal public economies and in unitary systems with independently elected local officials,
lower-tier governments are often the primary providers of nondefense public services.  As such, they
control a significant fraction of aggregate government spending and often raise significant levels of
their own revenues.  In the US, for example, state and local governments directly allocate 43 percent
of nondefense public goods and services, raise 50 percent of aggregate government taxation, and
through welfare spending and Medicaid allocate 20 percent of the aggregate government income
transfer budget.  Influencing the fiscal choices of these lower-tier governments can therefore provide
an important policy lever for stimulating GDP growth in times of recessions.  The primary policy
tools for doing so in federal public economies are intergovernmental transfers using price and income
incentives.  Section III has presented evidence that such transfers impact the private economy.  But
how?  Understanding the behavioral responses of lower-tier governments to intergovernmental aid
provides the answer.  Project aid (AP) uses weak incentives and is targeted at government purchases;
welfare aid (AW) uses strong incentives and is targeted at tax relief and transfers to lower-income
households.
A.  Specification and Identification:  We estimate state responses to federal
intergovernmental transfers, specified either as lump-sum (income) project aid or matching (price)
welfare aid, for the 48 mainland states for the years 1979 to 2010.  We do so within a fully specified
budgetary framework that accounts for all state spending and all state revenues, following the
methodology in Bohn and Inman (1996).
23  The state budget identity is specified as:      
   AP    +        (rs - b)       -     (gs  +  k)     / SURPLUS = Δc  -   Δd   +    Δf          (4)
($504) + ($3063 - $276) - ($3003 + $312) /  (-$24) =  ($81) - ($55) + (-$50),
where: 
AP =  State project aid per person defined as all exogenous federal aid to
states including general revenue-sharing, federal aid for education,
federal highway and transportation aid, annual payments under the
1998 Tobacco Settlement, and federal aid (other than Medicaid
23   Budgetary data for the analysis are from the Census of Governments, State Government Finances, various
years.  While the budget identity can be specified for the years back to 1947, our analysis is restricted to the 1979-2010
period because of our choice of explanatory variables, one of which is unexpected shocks to state unemployment rates
that are measured only from 1976 onward.  In addition, we allow for an AR(1) process to our error structure. 
19assistance) paid under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act; 
rs =  State revenues per person defined as all state taxes plus charges and
fees plus miscellaneous revenues plus profits from state-run utilities
plus profits from state liquor stores plus net proceeds from lottery
sales; 
b = State own expenditures per person for welfare and medical assistance
defined as aggregate state expenditures (B) minus federal aid for
welfare and Medicaid (AW = mCB, where m is the federal matching
rate for welfare and Medicaid spending: b = (1 - m)CB); 
gs  =  State expenditures per person for current  operations  plus
intergovernmental assistance paid to local governments plus interest
on state debt plus state own contributions to state public employee
retirement, workers’ compensation, and unemployment trust funds
(but excluding welfare and Medicaid spending);
k =  Total capital outlays per person;
Δc  =  Changes in cash and security holdings per person, other than in
insurance trust funds; 
Δd =  Changes in short- and long-term debt outstanding per person; and
Δf / Changes in contributions per person to insurance trust  funds
(including pensions) specified as Δf / SURPLUS - Δc + Δd. 
Sample means are reported below for each of the fiscal variables within the budget identity, measured
as real (2005) dollars per person.  Contributions to the trust fund (Δf) are treated as a residual
category to ensure adding up in our specification of the state budgetary accounts.
24  State project aid
(AP) specified here has been defined to correspond to the same federal aid programs used to define
project aid in our aggregate analysis.  
The LHS of equation (4) reports all revenues received by the state less all spending by the
24  We have chosen changes in the stock of insurance trust fund assets (Δf) as our “residual” category to ensure
cash flow balance.  The Census of Governments’  measures of holdings in insurance trust funds combine an unknown
mix of short- and long-term assets measured at market and book values.  Thus a measure of Δf computed directly from
changes in Census estimates of holdings will be very noisy, both over time and across states.  Fortunately, this  is not
as serious a problem for noninsurance cash and security holdings as those assets are typically held for short horizons. 
Our residual measure of Δf should be interpreted as cash moved into, or out of, the insurance trust funds required to
balance overall fiscal activities of the state in any fiscal year. 
20state.  The difference defines the cash flow surplus ( SURPLUS > 0) or deficit (SURPLUS < 0) in
each fiscal year.  Over our sample period, the average SURPLUS indicates a small deficit of -$24 per
person, but the standard deviation of SURPLUS is $263.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the states in our sample have run a balanced budget, on average, over the period 1979 to 2010.
25  The
RHS of equation (4) shows where the dollars go when there is a positive cash flow, or where the
dollars come from when there is a negative cash flow.  When there is a positive cash flow (surplus),
the extra funds can be saved in noninsurance savings accounts (Δc > 0: “rainy day” funds or bond
“sinking” funds),  used to repay outstanding short- and long-term debt (Δd < 0) or put into insurance
trust funds (Δf > 0: pension, workers’ compensation, unemployment benefit trust funds).  When there
is a negative cash flow (deficit), then funds must be withdrawn from the savings accounts (Δc < 0,
Δf < 0) or short- or long-term government debt must be increased (Δd > 0).  Over all the states and
years in our sample, there is a small average deficit paid for by increased government debt and
withdrawals from the insurance trust funds.
26         
To understand how states allocate an extra dollar of project aid or welfare aid across rs, b, gs, 
k, Δc, Δd, and Δf, we specify and estimate a behavioral budget model of state finances, specified
generally as: 
(rs, b, gs,  k, Δc, Δd, Δf) = f(AP,1 -  m; I, é; c-1; X) + υs + υt + υst,                 (5)
where each of the state fiscal choices is determined by a common set of federal policies (project aid,
AP, and matching aid for welfare and Medicaid, 1-m), the state’s economic environment (mean
household income, I, and unanticipated shocks to the state’s unemployment rate, é), the state’s lagged
savings wealth (c-1), and a set (X) of political, institutional, economic, and natural disaster controls. 
25  This is not to say that every year has been in average balance or that every state is in balance over time.  For
example, the average value of SURPLUS in fiscal years of the Great Recession was -$171/person in FY 2009 and  -
$105/person in FY 2010.  In non-recession years, however, average SURPLUS is typically positive, ranging from as
small as $3/person in FY1996 to $107/person in FY2006.  For average variation across the states, see Bohn and Inman
(1996). 
26  One should not make too much of these average changes in the savings and debt accounts.  First, all standard
deviations for these changes are far larger than their sample means.  Second, having positive increases in state debt is
not a problem if those increases are allocated to pay for capital outlays; on average (and assuming fungibility) this is the
case as k (=$312) > Δd (= $55).  Third, contributions to state insurance trust funds, importantly pension funds, are
already accounted for in state government spending (gs).  Whether those contributions are sufficient to fully fund state
pensions is another matter, but not at issue in this study.  Withdrawals from insurance trust fund accounts as
supplementary payments for one-time pension COLA payments or UE benefits are not uncommon.  
21The estimated budget equations also control for common shocks affecting all state budgets in any one
year (e.g., interest rate changes, federal tax reforms) using year fixed effects (υt) and unchanging
state-specific institutions (e.g., balanced budget rules), politics, and economic fundamentals affecting
budgetary outcomes using state fixed effects (υs).  Estimation is by generalized least squares.  The
within-year and state error terms (υst) allow for state-specific autocorrelation following an AR(1)
process and heteroskedasticity across states.  No spatial autocorrelation is assumed, however. 
To control for year-to-year changes within the state in important determinants of fiscal
choices – particularly those potentially correlated with federal policies – we include in X (i) political
controls: the state’s vote for the Republican candidate in the last presidential election, the Berry et
al. (2010) measure of conservative-liberal preferences of state residents, and whether the budget is
set in the year preceding the election of a governor; (ii) an institutional control: the adoption and then
presence of a requirement for contributions to a state rainy day fund; (iii) additional economic
controls: a state-specific consumer price index, national oil price shocks interacted with whether the
state is an energy- producing or energy-consuming state, and unexpected shocks to federal defense
spending within the state; and (iv) a control for natural disasters: the total economic damages from
disasters lagged one year.  Equation (5) is specified as a linear expenditure system, imposing an
adding-up constraint for the impact of each variable on fiscal outcomes.     
Key to identifying the effects of federal intergovernmental transfers on state fiscal choices
is the assumption that those transfers as measured here are uncorrelated with the unmeasured (υst)
determinants of state revenues, spending, and savings decisions.  We seek to establish the
appropriateness of this assumption by three specification strategies.  First, care is taken to ensure that
federal aid is specified to include only those transfers exogenous to each state’s current period
budget.  This will not be the case for total welfare and Medicaid aid specified as a federal matching
subsidy at a rate m per dollar of state welfare spending (B): AW = mCB.  Unmeasured shocks to B
will be correlated with AW, biasing the estimate of AW’s impact on state fiscal outcomes.  To
remove this source of endogeneity, we estimate the effect not of AW but of (1 - m) on fiscal
outcomes, where (1 - m) is exogenous to current state budget choices and can be interpreted as the
22“net price” of each dollar of state spending on welfare services.
27    Consistent with the budget
identity, the dependent variable for welfare spending will be own state spending for welfare services:
b = (1 - m)CB. 
Second, project aid (AP) is specified to include only those programs whose support is, by
design or administration, independent of current-period state spending.   This specification includes
all funding for public education, state transportation infrastructures, jobs and training, general
revenue sharing, and as part of the 1996 reform of welfare financing all federal aid to support income
transfers to lower-income households (known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or
TANF).
28   Finally, we include in AP the payments to states under the 1998 Master’s Settlement
Agreement with US tobacco companies as de facto federal project aid; in fact, the settlement was
motivated to a significant degree by a congressional threat to legislate such transfers.  Evidence on
the fungibility of such assistance across all budget allocations allows us to aggregate federal support
under all these programs into a single transfer to states; see Craig and Inman (1982) and Conley and
Dupor (2013) for federal aid and Singhal (2008) for tobacco settlement payments. 
Third, even after controlling for the endogeneity of aid because of legislative design, there
remains the possibility that special events within the state in a given year might motivate Congress
or the bureaucracy to offer, or take away, federal aid, and that these special circumstances might also
influence state budget choices.  A natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina seems one obvious
candidate.  If so, failing to control for such events will bias our coefficient estimates of aid’s effects
on budgets.  The bias seems most likely to affect our estimates for AP.  Efforts to find compelling
instrumental variables for such assistance, those with an F statistic near or exceeding the usual
27  The federal matching rate for welfare and Medicaid expenditures, m, known officially as the Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage, is set each year based upon the state’s three-year average income relative to the national average
income beginning five years before the rate applies – e.g., the matching rate that applies in 2012 is based on incomes
for the years 2007 to 2009.  The formula that sets m is quadratic in incomes.   Poorer states have higher matching rates
than richer states, but no state can fall below .50.  The number of states at the lower bound has ranged from as few as
11 to as many as 14 over our sample period.  There have been two important “policy moments” that led to significant
changes in m: in FY 2004 following the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 and in FY2009 and
FY2010 following ARRA.   Variation in m in other years turns on variation in the state’s five-year lagged income
performance relative to the rest of the country. 
28  Program details supporting the exogeneity assumption for project aid can be found in Craig and Inman (1982)
for education, Knight (2002) and U.S. Department of Transportation (2007, p. 19) for transportation, Gramlich (1978)
for jobs and training programs, Reischauer (1975) for general revenue-sharing, and Chernick (1998) for TANF support. 
 
23threshold for “strong” instruments, proved unsuccessful, however.
29  Use of weak instruments may
add to, rather than reduce, bias in our estimates; see Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995).  We therefore
adopt, as our third strategy, the inclusion of the economic, political, institutional, and disaster controls
included in  X to minimize possible bias in our estimates of federal aid’s effects on state budgets.  
  B. Results:  Table 5 summarizes our results for the impact of the fiscal policy and economic
variables on each of the seven budgetary aggregates.  Estimates for Δf are obtained from the budget
identity’s adding-up constraint.
30   Estimates for the effects of a $1 increase in the state’s mean
household income (I) show state government activities to be normal goods, even for welfare spending
(b).  From the first row of Table 5, state revenues (rs) rise by $.024/person, government current
spending (gs) by $.012/person, welfare spending (b) by $.002/person, and capital spending (k) by
$.001/person.  This leaves a positive cash flow from the marginal increase in state revenues of
$.009/person, which is then allocated as $.006/person to non-insurance fund savings (Δc, “rainy day”) 
and $.004/person to insurance trust fund savings (Δf).  There is also a $.001/person increase in state
debt (Δd), presumably to finance the $.001/person increase in capital spending.      
It is instructive, too, to see how state finances react to an unexpected increase in state
unemployment (é), particularly in light of the large surprise in state economic fortunes beginning in
FY2009.  The sample’s mean increase in é in 2009 was Δé = .022.  After within-fiscal-year
adjustments, our results predict that state revenues would still have declined by - $36.10/person. 
States are predicted to cut current spending by -$11.44/person and capital spending by -$1.48/person. 
Welfare spending would rise by $4.40/person, however.  The net result is still an end-of-fiscal-year 
deficit of - $27.58/person, or about 1 percent of the state budget, covered by an increase in state debt
29  We followed the approach of Knight (2002), using changes in congressional committee membership for the
state’s representatives, tenure of the state’s congressional delegation, and state party representation relative to party
majority in each chamber.  In addition, we added changes in the governor’s party relative to the state’s majority
congressional party and whether the state was a potential “swing state” based upon the closeness of the last presidential
election.  The resulting F statistics never exceeded 4.0 for our sample period. 
30  That is, d(Δf)/d(C) / d(AP)/d(C) + d(rs)/d(C) - [d(b)/d(C) + d(gs)/d(C) + d(k)/d(C)] - d(Δc)/d(C) + d(Δd)/d(C),
for C = I, AP, (1-m), c-1, and é.  The choice of Δf as the “residual” category for estimation follows from the decision to
use Δf as the residual category for cash flow budgetary balance; see footnote 24.
24of $29.44/person.
31 
    Increases in state project aid (AP) have no significant effect on state revenues (rs) or welfare
spending (b), but AP does increase spending on current state operations and transfers to local
governments (gs) and capital outlays (k); see the second row of Table 5.  Total state spending rises
by $.51 for each dollar increase in AP.
32  (Contrast to the spending impact of $1 of household income
of only $.015; here again, we have evidence of a flypaper effect.)  The remaining  $.49 of AP is net
savings and equals an increase of $.33 in the state’s rainy day fund (Δc) and $.19 in the state’s
insurance trust fund accounts (Δf), offset by a $.03 increase in state debt (Δd), again used to finance,
in part, state capital outlays.
33     
Project aid that is saved is spent in subsequent years as it is withdrawn from the state’s non-
trust fund accounts (c), but the rate of withdrawal is very slow and the added spending effects in the
near term are slight.
34  A $1 increase in the lagged value of noninsurance trust savings (c-1)
encourages the state to withdraw only $.107 from the account each year; see the fourth row of Table
5.  That $.107 is allocated $.006 to welfare spending, $.059 to current accounts spending, and $.01
to capital outlays.  Total spending rises by $.075.  The remaining $.036 is used to pay down debt
outstanding. (There is also a $.021 increase in state revenues that appears to go to further debt
31  The estimated impacts on each budget category are computed from the results in Table 5 as ΔéCd(C)/dé.  For
example, Δrs = .022C(-1641) = - $36.10/person.   From the revenue and spending impacts, we then estimate  ΔSURPLUS
= Δrs - [Δb + Δgs + Δk]) = -$36.10 - [$4.40 + (- $11.44 + (- $1.48)] =  -$.27.58.  The estimated impact on debt
outstanding = .022C1338.3 = $29.44.
32  Leduc and Wilson (2013) find that a dollar of highway assistance under the rules of ARRA leads to larger
effects on state spending, with a marginal effect of such targeted AP aid on highway spending ranging from .75 to 1.00. 
For this program there was a closely monitored “maintenance of effort” provision, and payment of aid was not made until
actual expenditures occurred and construction had begun.  What is not known is how spending changed for close
substitutes for highways construction – e.g., state support for public transportation and county roads – or, more generally, 
how easily other spending in our full list of AP programs can, or will, be monitored.  
33  We also tested for possible reallocations of AP in recession years and found no significant differences, except
for a $.02 reallocation of spending from current operations (gs) to capital outlays (k).  The category that was cut within
current operation spending was aid to local governments; spending for state services was unaffected.  Overall spending
from an additional  dollar of AP remained constant at $.50, with the remaining $.50 saved in rainy day and trust fund
accounts as reported in Table 5. 
34  We assume that withdrawals are done only from the noninsurance, or rainy day, fund; see National
Association of State Budget Officers, Fiscal Survey of the States, (various years), Chapter 3: Total Balances.  Savings
in the insurance trust fund accounts are held for specific events such as payments to unemployed or injured private sector
workers or for retirement benefits of state employees.  
25reductions and to contributions to the trust fund accounts.  Exactly why an increase in cash holdings
might “motivate” such behavior is unclear, but its net effects on state spending are negligible.)  From
these estimates, the final spending effects of a $1 increase in AP will be $.506 in the year aid is
received and only $.02 in each year thereafter.
35 
Increases in welfare aid (AW) are made by increasing the federal rate (m) for income transfers
paid as aid to families with dependent children (AFDC, until the 1997 reforms) and health care
outlays for lower-income households (Medicaid).   A state’s own expenditures (b) will equal qualified
welfare spending (B) less welfare aid (AW = mCB): b = (1 - m)CB.  The variable (1 - m) is the “net
 price” of welfare spending and B is the aggregate spending for welfare services for lower-income
families.  The elasticity of b and B with respect to (1 - m) can be specified as gb, (1-m) = 1 + gB,(1 - m). 
Based upon the results in Table 5, the estimated elasticities evaluated at the sample means are gb, (1-m)
= .57 and gB, (1-m) = -. 43.  Increasing the matching rate lowers the net price for welfare spending and
lowers own spending by the state, but increases aggregate spending going to poor households.  This
was the approach adopted by ARRA, which increased the matching rate from an average of .60 in
FY2008 to .70 for FY2009-2011. 
From row three of Table 5, a .10 rise in the federal matching rate (m) lowers the average net
price (1 - m) from .4 to .3, then leads to lower own welfare spending of -$40.59/person and, from
cross-price effects, to a fall in spending on government services of -$45.70  and in capital outlays of 
-$7.57.  Together, total government spending declines by -$93.86.  This savings is first allocated to
lower taxes for the middle class, which decline by -$52.58.  The remaining $41.28 is then allocated
to increase the rainy day fund by $.70, to pay down outstanding debt by $15.29, and to increase
savings in insurance trust funds by $25.30.  Transfers and services received by poor households are
higher because of the increase in m and can be estimated from changes in own welfare spending.  For
a .10 rise in the matching rate, evaluated at sample means, total support for poor households (B) rises
35  The year after the receipt of aid, there is a $.326 increase in cash savings.  This $.326 increase is withdrawn
at the rate of -.107 per dollar or by -$.035 (=-.107C.326) in the next fiscal year.  This $.035 withdrawal is then allocated
as $.025 to increased spending and $.01 to paying down of debt.  This leaves $.291 ( = .326 - .035) in the cash account,
which allows for another withdrawal of -$.031 (= -.107C.291) allocated as $.022 to spending in the third year after the
receipt of aid. The sequence is repeated again in year four and thereafter.   The final equilibrium increase in aggregate
state spending will be about $.75 per dollar of AP assistance, with $.506 occurring in the year the aid is received. 
26by $95/person, or, assuming a national poverty rate of 12 percent, by $792 per poor  person.
36  
The rise in state welfare spending and the higher federal matching rate mean increased federal
aid to state governments for welfare spending, that is, AW rises.  For a .10 rise in m, and again
evaluated at sample means, ΔAW = $135/person.  How is ΔAW spent?  The typical state allocates
$95/person to lower-income households and the remaining $40/person, along with the cuts in
spending, to pay for the fall in middle-class taxes, increased savings, and debt retirement.         
C. Implied Macro Multipliers: Just as microeconometric estimates of consumer and firm
behavior provide plausible bounds on estimated macroeconomic tax and spending multipliers, so too
can estimates of state government behavior bound our estimates for the macroeconomic effects of
federal AP and AW assistance.  Each form of assistance has three effects on state budgetary
behaviors: on taxes net of transfers (R = rs - B), on government purchases (G = gs + k), and on
changes in public wealth (ΔW = Δc - Δd + Δf).  Each budgetary effect has a potential multiplier
impact on the private economy.  
For  AP, the implied multiplier from state behavior is: 
dGDP/dAP = (dGDP/dR)C[dR/dAP] + (dGDP/dG)C[dG/dAP] + [dGDP/dW)C[dW/dAP], 
where dR/dAP = -.015, dG/dAP = .506, and dW/dAP = .488 from Table 5.
37  Our results in Table 3
provide estimates of the multipliers for net revenues and government purchases for our sample
period: dGDP/dR = -3.189 and dGDP/dG = .884 after four quarters or one fiscal year.   The multiplier
for an increase in public wealth might be approximated by the real interest rate (.03) times the
(positive, assuming eventual tax relief) value of the net revenue multiplier: dGDP/dW = (3.189C03)
= .096.  If so, then upon substitution a micro-behavior estimate of the four quarter AP multiplier
would be dGDP/dAP = .55, comfortably within the 95 percent confidence intervals for all our macro
estimates. 
36  Own welfare spending is defined as b = (1-m)CB, where B is transfers to poor households.  At sample means,
m = .6, and b = $276, so B = $690/person.  After m is increased to .7, b = $276 - $40.59 = $235.41.  At the new levels,
m = .7 and b = $235, then B = $785.  The implied increase in total lower-income transfers per person is therefore ΔB
= $785 - $690 = $95/person.  
37   From estimates in Table 5, the effect on net revenues (R) will be the -.000 effect on aggregate revenues (rs)
minus the increase in benefits (B) paid to poor households, which will equal Δb/(1-m), or .006/.4 = .015.  The effect on
government purchases (G) will equal Δgs + Δk = .379 + .127 = .506.  The effect on public wealth (W) will equal (Δc -
Δd + Δf) = .488. 
27For AW, the implied multiplier is: 
dGDP/dAW =  (dGDP/dR)C[dR/dAW] + (dGDP/dG)C[dG/dAW] + [dGDP/dW)C[dW/dAW],
where the effects of AW on net revenues, government purchases, and wealth are the coincident
changes in R, G, and W and then AW estimated from changes in the federal matching rate (m). 
Evaluated at sample means, dR/dAW = -1.09, dG/dAW = -.395, and dW/dAW = .31.
38  The negative
impact of AW on G, also observed in Taylor’s (2011) time series analysis, arises because of the
positive cross-price effects of (1 - m) on government purchases and the fact that AW increases as m
rises and (1 - m) declines.  Again assuming four quarter multipliers of dGDP/dR = -3.189, dGDP/dG
= .884, and dGDP/dW = .096, the implied four quarter multiplier for AW is 3.16.  This estimate is
higher than those reported in Tables 3 and 4, where the four quarter AW multipliers range from 1.5
to 2.1, but consistent with the large employment effects estimated by Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012)
in their analysis of ARRA’s .10 average increase in the matching rate.
39  
The important point here is not that we can replicate exactly our macro estimates from state
fiscal behaviors, but rather that the observed state behaviors help us understand the estimated macro
effect, and, in particular, the policy superiority of welfare aid over project aid as a way to stimulate
the aggregate economy.  AW is preferred to AP for two reasons.  First, AW aid is paid as a price
subsidy encouraging significant increases in transfers to poor households and in tax relief for middle-
class households.  Further, AW is paid only when the state pays transfers or gives tax relief.   In
contrast, AP is paid as a fungible income grant to states, and states save about half the grant, releasing
38   These marginal effects are based upon the effects of an increase in m of .10, evaluated at sample means,
where (from text above) ΔR = Δrs - ΔB = -52.58 - 95 = - 147.58; ΔG = Δgs + Δk = (-45.70) + (-7.57) = -53.27; and ΔW
= Δc - Δd + Δf = .70 - (-15.29) + 25.30 = 41.29.  The implied change in AW is ΔAW = 135.  The resulting estimates
are dR/dAW = -147.58/135 = -1.09; dG/dAW = -53.27/135 = -.39; and dW/dAW = 41.29/135 = .31.
39  The primary reason for the larger estimate here is our assumption that increased spending on lower-income
services  – in particular, Medicaid services – has the same household spending consequences as transfers of income. 
This will be true only if poor households receive all of new Medicaid funding in added services and spend on health care
exactly what increased Medicaid service provides.  This is unlikely.  Additional aid does expand Medicaid roles, and
once uncovered households are now insured.  But how changes in this coverage impact household consumption seems
an open question.  One estimate can be inferred from the work of Finkelstein et al. (2012), who estimate that persons
randomly selected to join Oregon’s Medicaid program incurred an additional $788/person health care expense above
that incurred by the non-selected controls (Table V) and saved $390/person in own expenses (Table VII).  Assuming that
Medicaid paid all of the additional medical expenses, these results suggest that about half of every dollar of Medicaid
spending becomes new income to Medicaid recipients.   Assuming that $.50 of each dollar of new Medicaid spending,
rather than the full dollar, becomes added income, then dGDP/dAW falls to 1.68 and within the range of estimates
reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
28saved funds only slowly in later budgets.  Our panel estimates confirm the aggregate time series
results of Gramlich (1978) and Taylor (2011).  Second, AW is paid to lower income households and
middle-class taxpayers as additional income.  When spent, AP raises government purchases.  The
consensus conclusion, confirmed by our results, is that the estimated macroeconomic multiplier for
tax and transfer relief is significantly larger, perhaps two to three times larger, than the multiplier for
government purchases.  
           
V.  ARRA as Fiscal Stimulus
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) has now spent $796 billion with the
hopes of stimulating the US economy onto a path of sustained economic growth after the greatest
recession since the 1930s.  We use an estimated version of the five variable SVAR of equation (3)
to evaluate the impact of this legislation on GDP growth.   The five variable SVAR allows us to
include both project aid (AP) and welfare aid (AW) as part of the policy evaluation.  For purposes
of the evaluation we have reestimated the SVAR for the pre-ARRA sample period 1960:1 to 2009:1. 
Based on these estimates, we then simulate the performance of the economy without, and then with,
ARRA policy innovations.
40  Table 6 summarizes our results.   
We specify the timing and size of ARRA’s fiscal innovations following Romer and Romer
(2010).  For ARRA innovations in federal net revenues we use the total tax savings and direct
transfers to households and firms that occurred in the first quarter after the passage of ARRA: ΔR =
40  Simulations for the path of GDP following the fiscal  innovations are calculated in four steps.  First, each
policy innovation is transformed into a corresponding structural shock for the five variable specification of equation (3)
denoted as (v
r
t, v
g
t, v
ap
t, v
aw
t), where shocks are the percentage change from the quarter preceding the innovation.  Second,
estimated and pre-assigned values of the β’s from the SVAR analysis are then used to provide vectors of the seasonally
adjusted reduced form fiscal shocks (u
C
t) for each year (t).  Third, given u
C
t, the estimated and pre-assigned values of
the α’s are used to solve for the reduced form fiscal shocks associated with each innovation.  Finally, the reduced form
fiscal shocks and the originally estimated VAR specified by eq. (1) with the control variable “deep recession” set equal
to 1 are used to provide a projected path for GDP following each fiscal innovation, first individually (Table 6, columns
(2)-(5)) and then for all four ARRA innovations together (Table 6, column (6)).  The predicted path of GDP without
ARRA innovations is also provided (Table 6, column (1)) as a benchmark for evaluating the impact of ARRA policies. 
All reported estimates of the incremental effects of policy on GDP are computed as the difference between the predicted
path of GDP with and without the innovation. We have also simulated the performance of ARRA using a reestimated 
seven variable SVAR including the federal funds rate and the inflation rate as two additional endogenous variables to
control for the role of monetary policy.  As reported in Table 4, the simulated impacts of fiscal policy on growth are from
5 to 10 percent less with monetary controls included but do not affect any of our substantive conclusions.  The simulation
results for this alternative specification are available upon request.    
29$45.2 billion in 2009:2.
41  For government purchases, we assign the innovation to the quarter when
actual purchases are first observed, with the level of the innovation equal to purchases in that quarter:
ΔG = $11.83 billion in 2010:1.  The lag of almost a year between the passage of ARRA and the actual
receipt of funds by the private economy reflects the time between application, application approval,
and receipt of funding for the programs included in the spending innovation.
42  Innovations in SL
project aid include additional funding for three existing federal aid programs: aid to K-12 education
(called “stability” aid), aid for infrastructure spending for roads and bridges, and aid for construction
of public housing.  Education assistance was paid immediately in 2009:2 and this innovation was
assigned the actual allocation in that period: ΔAP = $8.686 billion.  Significant funding for the
infrastructure projects and public housing was not observed until 2010:1 but then equaled  ΔAP =
$18.753 billion.  Finally, the innovation for welfare aid included added support for SL spending for
family services, child support, low-income housing allowances, and Medicaid and was first paid in
2009:2 at a level of ΔAW = $37.032 billion.
43    
The most effective of the individual ARRA policies is direct tax relief (ΔT); see Table 6,
column (2).  ARRA’s innovation in tax relief is estimated to increase GDP by $659/person at its peak
in 2009:4; this is an increase in GDP growth above the no-policy baseline of approximately 1.6
percent.  Tax relief continues to have a significant positive impact on GDP growth for at least two
years after the innovation.  The strong impact of tax policy is due to the relatively large estimated
41  Source: www.recovery.gov/News/featured/pages/TaxReliefDec2010.aspx.
42 The most important programs included in ΔG are direct federal expenditures for rural water and waste
disposal, energy efficiency and renewable resources, and science and health funding.  For these programs we have
detailed data on the timing of spending.  However, there are smaller initiatives for which detailed funding is not
available.  The larger programs for which data on timing are available equal 37.7 percent of all proposed ΔG spending. 
We assume the timing for all other, smaller programs matched that in the waste disposal, energy, and science initiatives. 
We therefore inflated the total spending in 2010:1 in these measured programs by 2.6 (=1/.377).  Total measured
spending in 2010:1 equaled $4.464 billion and (estimated) spending for all ΔG programs equaled $11.83 billion. 
Source: www.recovery.gov/Transparency/Agency/reporting/agency.aspx.
43   Full information on the timing of stability aid payments is available; $8.69 billion was paid in 2009:Q2. 
For project aid, full information is available for highway aid and for housing aid.  What is missing is information on the
many small project grants for job training, constituting about 26 percent of all proposed project aid in ARRA.  Highway
and housing aid for which we do have timing data equal 74 percent of all project aid.  We therefore adjust measured
project aid spending of $13.80 billion upward by 1.3589 (= 1/.74) for a total of $18.753 billion. The actual payments and
timing for Medicaid are reported, while funding for the many smaller programs are not.  Medicaid constitutes 83 percent
of total budgeted ARRA funding for AW assistance.  We therefore adjusted the actual Medicaid allocation in 2009:Q2
of $30.85.billion upward by 1.2 (= 1/.833) for a total AW innovation at this date of $37.03 billion.
Source: www.recovery.gov/Transparency/Agency/reporting/agency.aspx.
30multipliers for tax relief and the significant size of the innovation within ARRA.  
Also estimated to have a strong effect on GDP growth is ARRA’s innovation in welfare aid
(ΔAW); see Table 6, column (5).  The estimated increase in GDP is $147/person at its peak in
2009:4; this is an increase in GDP growth above the no-policy baseline of 3/10s of 1 percent.   The
ΔAW innovation continues to have a significant effect on GDP growth for another year.  Again, the
relatively large multiplier effects for AW, coupled with the relatively large innovation for such
assistance, explain its significant impact on GDP growth.  
Least effective of the ARRA policies, largely because of their relatively small multiplier
effects, are direct federal purchases (ΔG) and project aid (ΔAP).  The estimated maximal impact for
federal purchases is only $23/person in the  first quarter of the innovation, while that for project aid
is $38/person in 2010:3; see Table 6, columns (3) and (4), respectively.  The small estimated
multipliers for both policies explain their modest impacts.
44 
Table 6, column (6) shows the estimated impact on growth of all four ARRA policies working
in unison.  As a package, ARRA’s estimated maximal impact is $823/person, occurring in 2009:4. 
The innovations in government spending and project aid in 2010:1 provide a modest additional
stimulus to that available from (now declining) tax and tax-transfer policies.  The maximal impact
of ARRA on GDP growth is 1.8 percent.   
Finally, we provide estimates for the impact of an alternative, “improved”  policy strategy for
ARRA funding; see Table 6, column (7).  Under the improved policy, all of the federal spending
(ΔG) innovation is reallocated to the innovation in  ΔT (= $57.03 b. = $45.2 b.+ $11.83 b.) in 2009:2,
and all of the project aid (ΔAP) innovation is reallocated to the innovation in ΔAW (= $64.473 b. =
$37.03 b. + $8.69 b. + $18.753 b.), also in 2009:2.  Peak GDP growth again occurs in 2009:4 but now
equals $1094/person implying an 2.6 percent improvement in GDP over the no-policy benchmark;
see Table 7, column  (7).  The improved policy package increases the overall effectiveness of the
original ARRA allocations by approximately 30 percent in each of the quarters following the
44  This conclusion was appreciated by important policy makers at the time ARRA policies were being
formulated.  In a speech at the Brookings Institution in late January 2009, Alice Rivlin commented: “A long-term
investment program should not be put together hastily and lumped in with the anti-recession package.  The elements of
the investment program must be carefully planned and will not create many jobs right away”  (Suskind, 2011, p. 162). 
31innovations.
45
   The results in Table 6 illustrate our central conclusion: Direct transfers to households and
intergovernmental transfers to states for lower-income assistance using strong matching (price)
incentives are the preferred fiscal instruments for stimulating the US private economy.  Direct central
government purchases or unconstrained transfers to states to fund state purchases are significantly
less effective as tools for macro fiscal policy.
46   Had ARRA dropped federal purchases and project
aid from the policy mix and reallocated those dollars to general tax relief and matching welfare aid,
the efficiency performance of the stimulus package measured in GDP growth could have been
significantly improved, perhaps by as much as 30 percent.  
VI. Conclusions and Extensions 
The Great Recession has renewed both policy and academic interest in the ability of  fiscal
45  While we feel Table 6 provides a useful ranking of policies’ relative effectiveness, the precise predictions
should be used with caution.  First, it is clear from our predicted baseline path for GDP that our estimated VAR provides
a more optimistic (“V”) scenario for the recovery than that (“flat U”) actually observed.  The likely explanation for the
difference is the far-reaching crisis in the financial sector as the underlying cause of the Great Recession.  Recovery from
such crises is often protracted; see Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009).  How might this fact bias our policy conclusions? 
Fiscal policies that rely upon agents’ access to credit markets are likely to be those most adversely affected.  This will
be project aid to the SL sector as state and local governments may need to borrow funds to supplement federal aid for
project spending.  In contrast, direct tax relief and indirect welfare aid for SL transfers to lower income households both
relax credit constraints.  Thus our estimated impacts for these policies are much less likely to be affected by the current
economic environment.  Second, our estimated VAR does not contain any periods where monetary policy is at a “zero
bound.”  Thus our computed multipliers and therefore the estimated impact of ARRA policies may be understated; see,
for example, Woodford (2011).  For evidence there may be no significant differences in multipliers between growth and
slack periods, see Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).  In any case, our relative ranking of policies’ impacts is unlikely
to be unaffected; see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
46  As an additional check on our SVAR results we can compare the implied cost per job of ARRA policies that
we obtain from our time series, general equilibrium analysis to the direct estimates from the cross-section, partial
equilibrium studies.  Jobs created can be estimated applying Okun’s Law relating growth in GDP to reductions in the
rate of unemployment.  Here we assume a 2 percent increase in GDP lowers the rate of unemployment by 1 percent; see
Ball, et. al. (2013).  Evaluating each policy’s jobs performance by its peak impact on GDP (also within the sample
periods of the cross-section studies), we estimate the fiscal cost per job created for the two classes of federal aid
programs as $126,238/job for ARRA innovations in welfare aid (ΔAW) and $312,823 for ARRA innovations in project
aid (ΔAP).  These estimates correspond closely to those obtained by Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011) for welfare aid and
Conley and Dupor (2013) for project aid, but are significantly larger than those obtained by Chodorow-Reich, et.  al. 
(2012) for Medicaid alone.  We also estimate the cost per job of ARRA innovations in direct taxation (ΔT) and
government purchases (ΔG) as $39,342/job for tax relief policies and $177,199/job for direct federal purchases.  It is
reassuring perhaps that the cost per job from central government tax relief computed here is close to the estimates
obtained in Carlino and Inman (2013b) of $47,000/job for similar tax relief policies when all states act in unison as a
“fiscal cooperative” and provide common tax relief; see Carlino and Inman (2013b), Table 4.   Finally, taken as a
package, the cost per job created by all original ARRA innovations together is estimated to be $84,000/job.    
32policy to restore economies to full employment.  In the US, the response was ARRA, which  provided
$381 billion in federal tax cuts, $98 billion in federal government purchases, and $318 billion in
transfers to state and local governments to fund their own tax relief and spending strategies.  As a
federal union, the US public economy relies to a significant degree upon its state and local
governments to provide nondefense government services, to administer poverty relief, and to share
in the financing of such services and transfers.  If the central government wishes to expand state and
local spending or tax relief in times of an economic downturn, it will need to motivate lower-tier
governments to do so.  Other than by fiat, which is both constitutionally prohibited or politically
infeasible in most economic unions, centrally funded intergovernmental transfers are the required
fiscal policy.  This paper has sought to understand the likely impact of such assistance on US
economy’s  macroeconomic performance.  Our analysis offers three  conclusions.   
First, the impact on the aggregate economy of federal transfers to state and local governments
is not equivalent to that of federal tax cuts and transfers paid directly to individuals or firms.  For the
US economy, the average dollar given to the private sector is significantly more stimulative – i.e.,
it has a larger multiplier – than the average dollar given to lower-tier governments.  Transfers to
governments must be evaluated as a separate fiscal policy distinct in its macroeconomic impacts 
from those of taxes and transfers to the private sector.
Second, in economic unions, lower-tier governments are independently elected.  As
independent agents, they have their own agendas.  Accordingly, care must be taken to understand
how, and for what purpose, intergovernmental transfers are given to state and local governments. 
The structure of incentives matters.  From our analysis of state government fiscal choices, we find
price (i.e., matching grants) incentives are more effective than are income (i.e., unconstrained) 
incentives in stimulating tax and spending behaviors.  Unconstrained intergovernmental transfers,
or fungible program aid, provide general support for state and local governments’ budgets.  In the
case of US states, we find $.50 of each dollar increase in such assistance is saved and only slowly
spent in future years.  In contrast, matching aid targeted for welfare services is fully spent on tax
relief or low-income assistance and is paid only when such services or transfers are provided.  The
purpose of intergovernmental aid matters too.  From our analysis of the macroeconomic impact of
fiscal policies, assistance for tax relief or income transfers is more stimulative than assistance for
government purchases.  Together, these two facts help us understand why, at least for the US public
33economy, welfare aid (AW) is significantly more stimulative to the aggregate economy than is project
aid (AP).
Third, recognizing such differences in how, and for what purpose, intergovernmental aid is
given is important for the efficient design of macro-stabilization fiscal policies.  In the case of ARRA, 
reallocating all federal government direct purchases to federal tax relief and all intergovernmental
project aid to welfare assistance would have improved estimated income growth from ARRA funding
by about 30 percent.       
Though based on US data and US political institutions, we feel our central lessons have
applications for other current, or would-be, federal economies.  For example, the current economic
crisis within the European Monetary Union has again raised calls for a stronger fiscal union, and
therefore union-wide fiscal policies, to complement the European Central Bank and monetary policy
in combating economic recessions.  Given the Union’s strong commitment to the principle of
subsidiarity, it seems inevitable that if such a fiscal union were to emerge, intergovernmental
transfers would be a central fiscal tool for achieving Union-wide objectives.  At the moment, EU
intergovernmental transfers are a small share of any member country’s budget and paid only as
fungible project aid.  How to best design new transfers to help stabilize the Union’s macroeconomy,
recognizing that member countries will be independent economic agents, will be an important
extension of our work here. 
Also valuable would be an analysis of how intergovernmental transfer policies are chosen
within fiscal unions, recognizing the role of states, now not as agents but as principals, in
congressional politics setting fiscal policies.  From this perspective, perhaps it is no surprise that
ARRA required a significant component of fungible project aid to states for its passage, even though
such aid appears much less efficient than targeted welfare aid for achieving ARRA’s stated objective
of quickly restoring the economy to a path of positive growth.  Exactly which political institutions
provide the best opportunity to choose efficient fiscal policies is a wider question, but one clearly
relevant to the design of macro fiscal policies in economic unions.     
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